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Juror Bias-A Practical Screening Device and the
Case for Permitting Its Use*
I. INTRODUCTION
The principle of fairness underlies the constitutional man-
date that juries be impartial,' and it is the key to public confi-
dence in the jury system. Impartial juries are essential if
defendants are to believe that their day in court has been a fair
one. A crucial procedure for ensuring impartiality as well as
the appearance of impartiality2 is voir dire,3 the stage of trial at
* The study reported here has benefited in large measure from early en-
couragement and critical review by Professors Harold Chase and William Mor-
ris of the University of Minnesota Political Science Department. The
University's Honors Division and Computer Center provided financial support,
and the Hennepin County Court Administrator and Jury Office staff generously
offered crucial assistance.
1. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury... ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. The "cross section of the community" requirement for jury pool selec-
tion is at least as important for the appearance of fairness as it is for actual im-
partiality of the ultimate jury. The notion that "justice must satisfy the
appearance of justice" has been expressly cited as a factor in voir dire. Swain
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965). Maintaining the appearance of justice was
also a factor behind the Court's prohibition of one-man grand juries, see In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955), and its reversal of summary contempt pro-
ceedings initiated by a judge who was offended by a trial attorney's conduct.
See Offatt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954). See also Babcock, Voir Dire:
Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 552 (1975). There is an
inherent tension in jury selection, however, between the "cross section of the
community" requirement, which implies virtually random sampling, and the
need to dismiss prejudiced jurors, which obviously undermines the random se-
lection of a final panel. This tension was clearly evident in Swain v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 202 (1965), in which the prosecutor's repeated use of peremptory chal-
lenges to strike prospective black jurors was alleged to violate due process and
equal protection as well as the right to an impartial jury. Despite strong evi-
dence that prosecutors were systematically excluding blacks, the court upheld
the discretionary use of peremptory challenges. Id. at 227-28.
Even more fundamental than the effect of peremptory challenges on the
fair-cross-section goal is the relationship between authoritarianism and the ba-
sic function of the jury system. The function of the jury in a criminal case is to
serve as a buffer between the state and the individual whom the state is seek-
ing to deprive of physical liberty. An impartial jury-one drawn randomly from
a cross section of the community-will best serve as a buffer protecting crimi-
nal defendants from unfair use of the state's police power. Authoritarianism
goes to the core of the jury's function: the attitudes of some jurors toward au-
thority may be so strong that they are incapable of serving this buffer function.
The jury screening device described in this Note-the Legal Attitudes Ques-
tionnaire-taps this source of bias and could be applied to make the peremp-
tory challenge a meaningful remedy for protecting the impartiality of juries.
3. Literally translated, voir dire means "to see, to tell," or "[t]o speak the
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which prospective jurors are screened for final selection.4 The
panel of prospective jurors present at voir dire is drawn accord-
ing to the jurisdiction's rules or statutes.5 Members of a voir
dire panel are first questioned by the judge or trial counsel, or
sometimes by both,6 and then are either selected for the jury,
struck for cause,7 or dismissed by peremptory challenge.8
Voir dire has always been a somewhat unreliable method
for rejecting prejudiced jurors,9 and its effectiveness has be-
come even more questionable now that many trial judges re-
strict the scope of voir dire questioning in order to save time
and relieve congested dockets.10 To select juries more intelli-
gently under these conditions, trial lawyers have begun to turn
truth." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1746 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
4. See, e.g., FED. R. Cimu. P. 24(a); CAI. PENAL CODE § 1078 (West Supp.
1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, §§ 234, 431 (Smith-Hurd 1979); MINN. R. CflM. P.
26.02 (4); N.Y. Cpjm. PRoc. LAw §§ 270.15, 360.20 (McKinney 1980).
5. Juror pools generally are drawn randomly from broad-based lists, such
as voter registration or driver's license lists. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A-71-1
to -3 (1979).
6. Federal trial judges can conduct voir dire themselves, but must permit
the attorneys to submit questions; the judges are not, however, required to ask
the questions submitted. See FED. R. CRIm. P. 24(a). The judge also may allow
the defendant, the defendant's attorney, or the prosecutor to conduct all or part
of voir dire. Id. State courts have traditionally allowed broader attorney partic-
ipation in questioning. See Levit, Nelson, Ball & Chernick, Expediting Voir
Dire: An Empirical Study, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 916, 931-49 (1971). The trend in
both systems, however, is toward judge-conducted voir dire. See Babcock,
supra note 2, at 548-49.
7. Challenges for cause are unlimited in number, but must be based on
direct juror expressions of inability to decide impartially on the evidence. See
Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 235, 241-48
(1968); Note, Voir Dire: Establishing Minimum Standards to Facilitate the Ex-
ercise of Peremptory Challenges, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1493, 1500-02 (1975). For an
example of a situation in which apparent racial prejudice was held insufficient
to support a challenge for cause, see State v. Square, 257 La. 743, 823, 244 So. 2d
200, 229 (1971) (white juror's past association with Ku Klux Klan would not
prejudice him against black defendant), vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 938
(1972).
8. The number of peremptory challenges available to either side is usual-
ly fixed by statute or rule of court, although trial judges generally have discre-
tion to increase the number when necessary. This might occur in cases with
multiple defendants, or when there has been significant pretrial publicity. See,
e.g., FED. RL Crum. P. 24(b). See also Note, supra note 7, at 1502-04.
9. See Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL.
L. REV. 503, 505-21 (1965).
10. See generally Babcock, supra note 2; Imlay, Federal Jury Reformation:
Saving a Democratic Institution, 6 LoY. L.L REV. 247 (1973); Levit, Nelson,
Ball & Chernick, supra note 6, at 916; Zeisel,. . .And Then There Were None:
The Diminution of the Federal Jury, 38 U. Cmi. L. REV. 710 (1971); Note, supra
note 7.
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to other practices, such as conducting extensive investigations
of jurors' backgrounds"i and using systematic jury selection
techniques, that may skew the selection process in favor of one
side.12
This Note examines a new juror screening device-the Le-
gal Attitudes Questionnaire-that predicts which potential ju-
rors are most likely to harbor certain biases. Unlike polling
techniques and similar juror screening devices, the Legal Atti-
tudes Questionnaire is inherently useful to prosecutors and de-
fense counsel alike.13 This Note reports the findings of a field
study designed to test the predictive value of the questionnaire
in actual criminal trials.14 It also discusses the factors that
might enter into a court's resolution of the issue whether to
permit the questionnaire or some similar device to be used at
voir dire. The Note concludes that the Legal Attitudes Ques-
tionnaire has substantial predictive value for identifying jurors
who hold extreme biases, that it can be employed efficiently
during voir dire, and that courts should permit its use in crimi-
nal trials.
II. THE LEGAL ATTITUDES QUESTIONNAIRE
The Legal Attitudes Questionnaire (LAQ), developed by
psychologists and lawyers in 1965, is a thirty-item survey that
tests for the existence of authoritarian and antiauthoritarian at-
titudes.15 The LAQ assumes that there are three general types
of jurors in criminal trials16 (a) those who are predisposed to
11. See notes 83-87 infra and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of these new tactics, see THE JURY SYSTEM: NEW
METHODS FOR REDUCING JURY PREJUDICE (D. Kairys ed. 1975); McConahay, Uses
of Social Science in Trials with Political and Racial Overtones: The Trial of
Joan Little, 41 LAw & CoNrEMp. PROB. 205 (1977); Van Dyke, Selecting a Jury in
Political Trials, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 609 (1977); Zeisel & Diamond, Jury Se-
lection in the Mitchell-Stans Conspiracy Trial, 1976 A.B.F. RES. J. 151. For criti-
cism of the new tactics, see Etzioni, Creating an Imbalance, 10 TRiL 28 (Nov.-
Dec. 1974); Silver, A Case Against the Use of Public Opinion Polls as an Aid in
Jury Selection, 6 RUT. J. COMPUTERS & L. 177 (1978).
13. The Legal Attitudes Questionnaire tests for both "conviction-prone"
and "acquittal-prone" biases. See text accompanying notes 15-16 infra.
14. The findings of the field study are on file at the Minnesota Law Review.
15. The construction and experimental testing of the LAQ are reported by
its principal creator in Boehm, Mr. Prejudice, Miss Sympathy, and the Authori-
tarian Personality: An Application of Psychological Measuring Techniques to
the Problem of Jury Bias, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 734. For an explanation of how the
authoritarianism element was validated, see note 22 infra. The full text of the
LAQ appears in the Appendix.
16. This brief discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of the LAQ is de-
rived primarily from Boehm, supra note 15.
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favor the prosecution, to believe the testimony of police or of
other state witnesses, and to disbelieve the testimony of de-
fendants; (b) those who are predisposed to believe the testi-
mony of defendants and their witnesses, and to distrust
prosecutors and the testimony of police; and (c) those who
have no substantial predisposition in favor of either side. For
convenience, these juror types are labeled Type A, Type B, and
Type C, respectively. Type A jurors score as "authoritarian" on
the LAQ and should be more conviction-prone or biased
against defendants than Type B or C jurors. Type B jurors
score as "antiauthoritarian" and should be more acquittal-
prone or biased in favor of defendants than Type A or C jurors.
Type C jurors score as "equalitarians" and should be the group
most likely to be unbiased.
The LAQ's theory of bias is crucial to the questionnaire's
utility in the courtroom. Courts and practitioners are con-
cerned mainly with verdict-relevant bias-that is, bias prompt-
ing a juror to lean toward conviction or acquittal.' 7 Verdict
relevance is a function of how strongly a bias is held and how
relevant the bias is to a specific trial.18 There are a variety of
17. This bias need not be verdict-determinative. Verdict-relevant biases
filter, rather than determine, a juror's perceptions; they prompt jurors to view
the same objective evidence differently and can lead to different verdict prefer-
ences in the same case. These biases are not so strong, however, that they nec-
essarily lead jurors to a particular verdict regardless of substantive evidence.
18. A juror's racism, for example, would not be verdict-relevant in a case in
which all the trial participants were of a race toward which the juror felt no an-
tagonism. The relationship between bias and verdicts can be displayed graphi-
cally:
Strength of Bias or Attitude in Juror
low verdict low to medium
relevance verdict relevance
a
low to medium high verdict
verdict relevance relevance
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juror biases that may have some relevance in a criminal trial,' 9
but the LAQ is designed to reveal one of the most fundamental:
the attitude of jurors toward authority.20 Since each criminal
trial pits the state against an alleged transgressor, a predisposi-
tion to believe or trust those on either side of the authority
equation will certainly have some effect on a juror's tendency
to reach a given verdict. Thus, to the extent that the LAQ relia-
bly reveals attitudes toward authority that correlate with actual
biases, its value as a jury-screening device is potentially sweep-
ing because of the strong verdict-relevance of this bias.
The LAQ is divided into ten sets, each containing three
statements.2 ' For each set, respondents must indicate the
statements they agree with most and least, and leave one
choice blank. Although the statements in each set are designed
to reflect authoritarian, antiauthoritarian, and equalitarian pre-
dispositions, 22 the key factor is not the intrinsic meaning of the
statements, but the relative ranking that respondents give
19. See generally Broeder, The Impact of the Vicinage Requirement: An
Empirical Look, 45 NEB. L. REV. 99 (1966); Broeder, Occupational Expertise
and Bias as Affecting Juror Behavior: A Preliminary Look, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1079 (1965); Friend & Vinson, Leaning Over Backwards: Jurors' Responses to
Defendants' Attractiveness, 24 J. CoM. 124 (Summer 1974); Landy & Aronson,
The Influence of the Character of the Criminal and His Victim on the Decisions
of Simulated Jurors, 5 J. EXPER. SOC. PSYCH. 141 (1969); Nemeth & Sosis, A
Simulated Jury Study: Characteristics of the Defendant and the Jurors, 90 J.
Soc. PsYcH. 221 (1973).
20. This study did not examine the relevance of the LAQ to jury selection
in civil cases. Since most civil trials present a conflict between private individ-
uals rather than between an individual and the state, the LAQ's focus on au-
thoritarianism would not seem particularly relevant. It is certainly conceivable
that authoritarians and antiauthoritarians view large corporations in a way that
parallels their attitudes toward the state, since large corporations and the state
together comprise "the establishment." There is nothing in this study, how-
ever, that bears out such an inference. Thus, the more important aspect of the
LAQ with respect to its possible application in civil cases is its methodology:
forced-choice questions that indirectly probe juror attitudes. A similar ap-
proach might be employed to measure verdict-relevant attitudes in civil cases.
21. A sample set of statements is:
A. The failure of a defendant to testify in his own behalf should not
be taken as an indication of guilt.
B. The majority of persons arrested are innocent of any crime.
C. Giving an obviously guilty criminal a long drawn-out trial is a
waste of the taxpayer's money.
For the complete text of the LAQ, see Appendix.
22. The statements used in the LAQ were drawn from newspapers and
similar publications. See Boehm, supra note 15, at 741. A sample of respon-
dents was given the LAQ together with the F-scale and dogma-scale tests,
which are independently validated psychological measures of authoritarianism.
Id. at 739. Responses to the LAQ and the other tests showed moderate to high
correlations, indicating that the LAQ statemefits tap attitudes related to au-
thoritarianism in a manner similar to the other scales. Id.
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them. There are a total of thirty statements in the LAQ-ten
authoritarian, ten antiauthoritarian, and ten equalitarian. In
scoring the responses, 23 the statement within each set marked
"most in agreement" is given a 3, the statement not marked at
all is given a 2, and the statement marked "least in agreement"
is given a 1. By separately totaling the scores for the authorita-
rian, antiauthoritarian, and equalitarian statements, three sub-
scores corresponding to the three attitudinal categories are
created.24 A respondent is labeled either Type A, B, or C based
on which of his subscores shows the greatest standard devia-
tion from the sample's mean subscores.25 In short, the label A,
B, or C simply indicates on which of the three subscales an in-
dividual respondent is most unlike the respondents as a whole.
As this scoring suggests, not every response that indicates
an authoritarian or antiauthoritarian predisposition is a clear
indication of prejudice. The LAQ assumes that prospective ju-
rors have many attitudes, some of which could be considered
authoritarian and others antiauthoritarian. The responses sim-
ply identify the extreme cases-those potential jurors who
most consistently place themselves on one end of the authori-
tarianism spectrum.
JII. THE STUDY'S METHODOLOGY
The field study reported in this Note was designed to ascer-
23. The scoring system described here is the same as that used by the
LAQ's creators.
24. The range of scores for each subscale is from 10 (i.e., all authoritarian
statements marked for "least agreement") to 30 (i.e., all authoritarian state-
ments marked for "most agreement").
25. "Mean" scores are a form of average scores. The mean is computed by
adding all the scores and then dividing the sum by the number of items. The
term "mean" is used to distinguish the figure from other statistical measures
such as mode and median, which are also forms of average scores.
Standard deviation measures the degree of variability in a set of scores. It
is determined by computing the mean and then determining the deviation of
each score from the mean. The deviation of each score is squared, and the sum
of the squared deviations is divided by the number of scores. The square root
of this figure is the standard deviation. The smaller the standard deviation, the
more closely the scores are grouped about the mean. See generally H. KEND-
LEP, BASic PSYCHOLOGY 54-60 (2d ed. 1968).
In this study, a mean was computed for responses on each subscale. Be-
cause the labels-Type A, B, or C-are based on standard deviation, the label
assigned to a juror reflects the subscale on which he was farthest from the
mean. The importance of this scoring system is that it measures relative ten-
dencies; there are no right or wrong answers and there is no specific "cut off"
point for authoritarianism or antiauthoritarianism. The LAQ simply identifies
those persons on a panel of jurors who are the most authoritarian and an-
tiauthoritarian.
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tain whether the LAQ can reliably identify jurors who harbor
actual biases in criminal trials.26 The study compared groups
predicted to hold biases on the basis of their LAQ responses
with those who gave actual indications of bias in post-trial in-
terviews. The purpose of the study was to produce findings of
value to courts and criminal lawyers, even though that objec-
tive necessitated certain research methods that social scientists
might not find totally satisfying.27
The sample group was drawn from actual jurors in criminal
trials that occurred in a major metropolitan court.28 Jurors
26. The LAQ has been tested under experimental conditions. A group of
college psychology students was given one of two written forms of a man-
slaughter case; one form was designed to lean toward a "guilty" verdict and the
other toward a "not guilty" verdict. If a subject voted to convict for manslaugh-
ter or second-degree murder when presented with the innocent-leaning case,
he was labeled "overly tough," and if he voted to acquit or convict for man-
slaughter (rather than the more serious second-degree murder option) when
given the guilty-prone case, he was labeled "overly lenient." Boehm, supra
note 15, at 746. Boehm found that those making the "overly tough" error scored
disproportionately as authoritarians on the LAQ, and that those making the1
"overly lenient" error scored disproportionately as antiauthoritarians. Id.
Until now, Boehm's experiment was the only published evidence of the
LAQ's potential utility in jury selection. The experiment has several weak-
nesses. First, the sample was limited to college students, a group among the
least likely to serve on actual juries. Second, paper and pencil "trials" are very
unlike actual trials, which have witnesses, counselors, and defendants; at trial,
these participants usually exhibit a wide range of characteristics that can play
to juror biases. Finally, the Boehm study did not account for other biases that,
at an actual trial, might override the authoritarian or antiauthoritarian tenden-
cies of a juror. The study reported in this Note focuses on actual jurors and
trials, and should provide information that is more credible to lawyers and
judges.
27. Several methodological problems result from using real courtrooms as
laboratories. In this study, for example, concern over the possibility of jury-
tampering required that juror interviews not be conducted until after the trial.
This technique may cause problems with recall and untruthfulness. See note
36 infra (corrective measures taken in this study). Another problem is the ele-
ment of nonrandomness that arises when participation in a study is voluntary.
See note 30 infra. An additional problem is the possibility that a juror's per-
ceptions of the early stages of the trial may be colored by subsequent stages
that have intervened before the interview. The most significant problem with
this study, however, is that with so many different trials, defendants, lawyers,
and other factors affecting the results, the tremendous variety of biases that ju-
rors might have could mask the pattern of bias to be predicted by the LAQ.
This problem is due to the impossibility of isolating a single source of bias, as
is done in experimental studies. This problem, however, is also an indication of
the LAQ's greatest strength. The diversity of possible biases in real court-
rooms is precisely the problem that a screening device must cope with if it is to
be given credence by courts and practitioners.
28. The field phase of the study took place over a 12-week period in the
District Court of Hennepin County, Minnesota. Hennepin County is comprised
of the city of Minneapolis, its suburbs, and a small rural fringe, and has a popu-
lation of approximately one million people.
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from all eighteen of the felony trials that were held during the
study period were included, creating a diverse set of trial cir-
cumstances against which to measure juror biases. 29 Participa-
tion in the study was voluntary. Nevertheless, of the 216 jurors
who sat at the trials, 117 participated fully by taking the LAQ
and later answering detailed questions about their trial exper-
iences.30 Although there are some problems with this type of
sample, the transferability of this study's findings to actual
courtroom settings far outweighs the absence of the statistical
neatness that could have been achieved had experimental ju-
ries been used.31
29. The following chart summarizes the 18 trials and verdicts:
Trial Charges
1 First-degree criminal sexual conduct; kidnapping;
sodomy
2 Carrying handgun without permit
3 Burglary; aggravated assault; kidnapping
7 Robbery; theft over $2500
8 Two counts of terroristic threats
9 Aggravated assault
10 Receiving stolen goods
11 Third-degree murder
12 Two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct
13 Fraud in obtaining credit; two counts of swearing
to fraudulent statements
14 Attempted theft
15 First-degree murder
16 Escape from custody; aiding offender to avoid
arrest; obstructing legal arrest; aggravated assault
17 Two counts of drug possession with intent to sell
18 Two counts of aggravated robbery
Verdict
Not guilty
Not guilty
Guilty only of simple
assault
Guilty on both
counts
Count one dismissed;
guilty on count two
Not guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty on both
counts
Not guilty on count
one; guilty on both
other counts
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty on counts two
and three
Not guilty
Guilty on both
counts
30. Some might question whether the voluntary nature of the participation
skews the-sample. An analysis of control group scores, see text accompanying
notes 32-34 infra, indicated that the volunteer group of trial participants was
not-at least in terms of LAQ-scored attitudes-significantly different from the
nonparticipating control group. Furthermore, it is unimportant whether non-
participants might be more or less biased than participants, since this is not a
study of "objective" degrees of bias, but a study assessing whether the relative
propensity to be biased can be predicted by the LAQ. That differences may ex-
ist between participants and nonparticipants has nothing to do with whether
the LAQ predicts which jurors in a given group are the most biased.
31. With 18 different trials, a number of circumstances existed that might
have triggered biases unrelated to LAQ attitudes. Still, the LAQ must have
predictive value in such a broad array of settings if it is to be an effective tool in
assessing fundamental attitudinal bias. Experimental research designs using
[Vol. 64:987
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The LAQ was administered to the members of the sample
group after they had completed jury duty so that therie would
be no possibility of jury-tampering. In addition, a control group
of seventy-one persons, who had originally been called for jury
duty but did not serve, took the LAQ. On the authoritarian
subscale, the mean scores of the control group and the sample
group who served on juries did not differ significantly.32 On the
other subscales, however, the difference in the mean scores of
the two groups was statistically significant,3 3 thus indicating
that the trial experience had an effect on response patterns.
Further analysis showed, however, that the trial experience did
not have a significant impact on the labels-Type A, B, or C-
derived from the LAQ responses, and it is these labels that are
the key predictors the study was designed to test. The trial ex-
perience factor was nevertheless factored into the scoring.34
Interviews with participating jurors35 took place within two
mock trials are more neat statistically because the researcher can control for
certain variables. They suffer, however, from a number of weaknesses that this
study is designed to correct. See note 27 supra.
32. All statistical work related to this study is on file with the Minnesota
Law Review.
33. The concept of statistical significance entails a comparison of two vari-
ables-in this case, the subscale scores of those on juries and those in the con-
trol group-and a computation of the likelihood that the relationship between
the variables is due to random chance rather than some systematic association.
A "statistically significant" difference between the mean subscores on two of
the scales means that there is less than a five percent probability that the dif-
ferences are due to random variation (using t-test or Chi-squar statistics). See
note 49 infra. Thus, the trial experience, rather than random chance, probably
caused the differences in mean scores noted in the text.
34. The LAQ label for each juror was derived from the juror's standard
deviation from the mean subscores. See note 25 supra. Mean scores were com-
puted separately for the sample group, the control group, and all respondents
as a whole. The standard deviations were then derived in the same manner,
and LAQ labels were attached. Of the 117 respondents who sat on juries, 112
received the same LAQ label regardless of how it was computed. This means
that the differences between the mean scores of the sample and control groups
did not affect the label assigned in 112 of the 117 cases. The five jurors that
were affected would have scored as Type C if whole-sample means were used,
but scored as Type B when measured against the mean of the sample group.
These five jurors were scored on the basis of the latter mean in order to "cor-
rect" for the skewing arising from their trial experience.
35. Both personal interviews and return-mail questionnaires were used.
The 12 potential participants from each trial were contacted in random order,
and the first quarter of the willing jurors from each case were interviewed im-
mediately. If time and the jurors' schedules permitted, more interviews took
place at a later date. Of the 117 juror participants, 53 were interviewed person-
ally, and the balance completed the mail questionnaire. The initial questions in
the personal interview were exactly the same as on the mail form so that dic-
tion or other problems could be identified. No significant problems were dis-
covered.
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weeks of trial to ensure that memories were fresh.36 Post-trial
questions were designed to provide indications of bias, so that
jurors giving such indications could be compared with those
whose LAQ resp6nses predicted a strong likelihood of bias.
The interviews used measures of bias seemingly imprecise to
social scientists, but intuitively meaningful to practitioners.
The measures employed were: juror assessments of the de-
fendant's credibility; 37 juror beliefs concerning how often de-
fendants are innocent;38 the effect that the defendant's possible
36. The post-trial interview tactic has been criticized because it leaves
open the possibility of untruthful or inaccurate recall. Anticipating this, the
study was designed to minimize recall problems. First, all jurors were inter-
viewed within two weeks of their trial. Second, most of the study's key bias
measures were by their nature largely unaffected by recall. For example, a ju-
ror's perception of how frequently defendants are actually innocent, see note 38
infra and accompanying text, does not require any recall of his trial experi-
ence. Third, although some facts relevant to the bias measures may have been
forgotten, the nature of the questions used probably reduced this possibility to
a significant extent. The question concerning the effect of possible sentencing
is an example. See note 39 infra and accompanying text. If a juror forgot what
effect the sentence had, he would most likely select the answer "no effect" or "I
didn't know what the sentence was." Intuitively, it is extremely unlikely that a
juror would attempt to state a prior perception that he has now forgotten when
he has neutral alternatives available. Finally, to the extent that inaccurate re-
call was actually a problem, it probably operated to mask response patterns
otherwise predictable from LAQ scores. The problem of recall might account
for the lack of a predicted pattern, but it is difficult to imagine how random for-
getfulness or inaccurate recall could combine systematically to produce pat-
terns of bias-across all juries and all measures of bias-that correspond with
patterns predictable from LAQ scores.
37. In trials in which the defendant took the stand, jurors were asked-
Try to think for a moment just about the defendant's testimony itself-
as if there were no other evidence presented at the trial. Did you per-
sonally find that the defendant was...
(a) very believable?
(b) somewhat believable?
(c) somewhat hard to believe?
(d) very hard to believe?
Jurors were also asked how important this credibility factor was to their per-
sonal verdict choice.
If the defendant did not take the stand, jurors were asked:
Did the fact that the defendant did not take the stand tend to make you
(a) lean toward conviction?
(b) lean toward acquittal? or
(c) did it not matter at all?
A similar follow-up question gauged the importance of this factor on the juror's
personal verdict choice.
38. Jurors were asked:
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sentence had on the juror;39 the time during trial at which the
juror first began forming a verdict preference; 40 and juror'rat-
ings of the performance of counsel.4 1
The major difficulty with using these or any other indicia of
bias is finding an "objectively true" answer or attitude against
which to measure juror responses. This study took a more real-
istic approach, using the average view of each jury as the yard-
stick against which to measure the existence of bias in its
individual members. A defendant's credibility on the stand, for
example, cannot be measured objectively; within certain limits,
unbiased persons can certainly disagree about the degree of
credibility displayed. Consequently, a juror's rating of a de-
fendant's credibility was taken as an indicator of bias only if it
How often do you think defendants that are brought to trial are actu-
ally innocent?
(a) almost never innocent
(b) seldom innocent
(c) occasionally innocent
(d) quite often innocent
(e) most are innocent
39. The question was:
Try to think about the possible sentence the defendant could have re-
ceived. Did the possible sentence tend to make you...
(a) lean toward acquittal?
(b) lean toward conviction?
(c) no effect at all?
(d) did not know the possible sentence?
40. There were three questions in this subject area:
(1) As a trial progresses, most jurors find themselves leaning toward
acquittal or conviction, sometimes changing their minds several times
in the course of the trial. Try to think back to the opening arguments
and recall when it was that youfirst started leaning toward acquittal or
conviction. Was this...
(a) after opening arguments?
(b) after the prosecution rested?
(c) after the defense rested?
(d) after final arguments?
(e) not until deliberations began?
(2) Which way were you leaning at the point you indicated on the
preceding question (toward conviction or toward acquittal)?
(3) If you had to reach a personal verdict immediately after opening
arguments, which way would you have voted?
(a) for conviction
(b) for acquittal
(c) not sure
41. The jurors were first asked to rate separately the performance of the
prosecutor and defense counsel as (1) excellent, (2) good, (3) only fair, or (4)
poor. The third question asked jurors to compare the counsel for both sides:
Which of the following best describes your rating of the attorneys in-
volved in the case?
(a) The prosecutor was much better.
(b) The prosecutor was only somewhat better.
(c) There was no difference.
(d) The defense counsel was only somewhat better.
(e) The defense counsel was much better.
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differed substantially from the other jurors' ratings of the same
defendant.42 If the jurors' ratings of a defendant were widely
scattered, none of the responses would be taken as indicators
of bias.
A second problem with these measures is that jurors might
lie rather than give answers that could make them appear bi-
ased.43 This problem was largely solved by the predictive con-
struct employed in this study, since the study focused on those
jurors who revealed bias, not on jurors who appeared unbiased.
Assuming that people lie only to hide bias, the analytical ques-
tion became this: are those who reveal bias more likely to
score as Type A, B, or C jurors on the LAQ? This approach
sidestepped the untruthfulness problem because it did not at-
tempt to ascertain whether apparently unbiased respondents
had been truthful or not. Thus, by focusing on those who re-
vealed bias, the study removed the untruthfulness element
from its basic predictive analysis.
IV. THE FINDINGS
Once the sample jurors were scored and labeled on the
LAQ,44 the post trial measures of bias were cross-tabulated
42. There was also no objectively correct answer on the performance of
counsel. If most jurors thought one side's counsel was excellent but one or two
others thought it poor-or vice versa-the existence of the small minority was
treated as an indication of bias. There are a myriad of factors, however, that
could override such predicted bias: a juror might not like a lawyer's accent,
clothes, speech pattern, or general demeanor. This reflects the roughness of
the bias measure. Still, if the LAQ construct is valid, the predicted predisposi-
tions of these jurors should include a tendency to favor one side's counse: to
be more impressed by his performance or less impressed with his opponent's
performance.
43. See notes 78, 97 in.fra.
44. Since the LAQ was designed in 1965, some of its statements may reflect
attitudes toward legal issues that are no longer current. To determine whether
the assignment of LAQ labels-Type A, B, or C-had been skewed by the pas-
sage of time, extensive analysis was conducted on the LAQ's internal coher-
ence. Each of the 30 statements was first cross-tabulated with the LAQ group
labels. See note 45 infra. The results showed that each LAQ subgroup did in
fact exhibit the greatest propensity to mark its corresponding subscale items
for "most agreement." Other frequency analyses involved comparing the pro-
pensity of each LAQ group to mark noncorresponding subscales for "least
agreement." Finally, each subscale item was examined to see if a majority of
the proper LAQ group had marked the item for "most agreement." These anal-
yses were applied to mean item scores as well as to item frequencies.
To summarize the results of this lengthy analysis, ten of the LAQ's state-
ments were identified as weak performers. In other words, ten of the state-
ments did not differentiate the subgroups as well as the other statements.
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with the LAQ attitudes, 45 focusing throughout on measures of
conviction-prone bias. 46 The first set of post-trial questions in-
volved jurors' ratings of the defendant's credibility, or jurors'
reactions to the defendant's decision not to take the stand.47
The responses to these items are summarized in Table 1, in
which all jurors48 are categorized either as (1) having exhibited
a predisposition to disbelieve defendants or to consider their
Three of these items were on the Type A subscale, four were on Type B, and
three were on Type C.
There can be little doubt that some of the items have suffered from the pas-
sage of time. The statement that the "Supreme Court is Communistic," for ex-
ample, was probably a referent for reaction to Warren Court decisions on
subjects such as school prayer and the rights of defendants. By the late 1970s,
decisions on abortion, the death penalty, and other controversial issues proba-
bly clouded the authoritarian biases this statement was designed to tap. Two
of the weak items tapped racial attitudes. The fact that neither produced re-
sponse patterns consistent with the rest of the LAQ suggests quite strongly
that racial attitudes cut across the authoritarianism lines established by the
LAQ. Most of the other weak items were part of the triad that included one of
the above items, suggesting that the former were not intrinsically weak but
were probably skewed by the other weak choice in the triad.
As a final check, all ten weak items were excluded and the respondents
were rescored on the remaining items. Of the 117 jurors in the sample, only 17
scored differently under the best-item version of the LAQ. Moreover, the "all-
item" subscores correlated extremely well with the "best-item" subscores.
Type A subscale scores on the all-item and best-item versions showed a .95 cor-
relation; Type B subscores showed a .89 correlation; and Type C subscores
showed a .90 correlation. All correlations were significant at the .0001 level
Clearly, the best-item version taps the same attitude dimensions as the original
LAQ. The balance of this Note reports analysis reflecting the best-item version
of the LAQ. Most of the bias analysis was also conducted with the all-item ver-
sion of the LAQ labels and the restructuring did not affect the basic thrust of
any of the findings.
45. A cross-tabulation is simply a display of the relationship between the
frequency distributions of two variables. In this study, LAQ groupings were
cross-tabulated with interview responses. The resulting relationship was then
analyzed to determine what proportion of the Type A, B, and C groups revealed
a given bias, and which proportion was greatest. Related analysis assessed
whether the relationships observed-for example, that one group was the most
likely to reveal a certain bias-were due to random chance or to a systematic
association between the variables (i.e., due to what the LAQ predicted). This
analysis involved the concept of statistical significance, which is explained in
note 33 supra and note 49 infra.
46. The data were not reanalyzed to infer acquittal-proneness: having
found that the most "authoritarian" jurors were most likely to convict, it
seemed probable that the most "antiauthoritarian" jurors would be the least
prone to convict.
47. The precise questions asked are found in note 37 supra.
48. Table 1 displays juror responses from all trials in. which the defendant
did not take the stand and from the six trials in which the defendant testified.
Credibility ratings showed that some jurors significantly underrated the de-
fendant's testimony. Necessarily excluded were the trials in which the defend-
ant testified, but juror ratings were too scattered for any individual response to
be an indicator of bias.
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not testifying as evidence of guilt, or as (2) not having exhib-
ited a predisposition to disbelieve defendants or to consider
their not testifying as evidence of guilt.49 Table 1 shows that
Type A (authoritarian) jurors were approximately three times
as likely to exhibit this bias against defendants than either of
the other groups.50 Moreover, although Type A jurors made up
only 40.5% of the sample group of participating jurors, they
constituted 66.3% of those revealing an antidefendant bias.5 1
TABLE 1. Direct assessments of the defendant by LAQ groups.
(raw #)
row % Type A Type B Type C ROW
column % jurors jurors jurors TOTALS
Jurors not biased against (18) (14) (24) (56)
defendant testifying or 32.1% 25.0% 42.9% 75.7%
failing to testify. 60.0% 87.5% 85.7%
Jurors exhibiting bias (12) (2) (4) (18)
against defendant testify- 66.3% 11.6% 22.4% 24.3%
ing or failing to testify. 40.0% 12.5% 14.3%
COLUMN TOTALS (30) (16) (28) (74)40.5% 21.6% 37.8% 100%
CmH-SQUARE TEST: SIGNIFICANT AT .05
The second measure of bias involved the presumption of
innocence. 52 The inference employed here was that jurors who
believe that defendants are seldom or almost never innocent
probably are biased against the particular defendant appearing
49. For all the cross-tabulations reported or implied in this study, the Chi-
square test of statistical significance was used. That test involves computing
row and column marginal totals that would be expected if there were no associ-
ation between the variables in the table and then estimating the likelihood that
the difference between the expected marginal totals and the actual marginal
totals is due to chance variation. A given pattern between the two factors is
"statistically significant" at the .05 level if there is less than a five percent
chance that the relationship shown-for example, that Type A jurors are more
likely to disbelieve defendants-is due to random variation rather than a sys-
tematic association.
50. 40.0% of the Type A jurors revealed this bias, as opposed to 12.5% and
14.3% of the Type B and C groups, respectively.
51. Even when juror responses to the defendant's failure to testify were
separated from the responses given when the defendant did testify, the pattern
remained significant at .05. Type A jurors were three times as likely as Type C
jurors to admit that they favored conviction in reaction to the defendant's fail-
ure to testify, and none of the Type B jurors so responded.
52. See note 38 supra.
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before them.5 3 The juror responses appear in Table 2.
TABLE 2. Frequency with which defendants are believed innocent by LAQ
groups.
(raw #)
Jurors saying that row % Type A Type B Type C ROW
defendants are: column % jurors jurors jurors TOTALS
ALMOST NEVER or (14) (7) (8) (29)
SELDOM INNOCENT 48.3% 24.1% 27.6% 25.2%29.2% 22.6% 22.2%
OCCASIONALLY (31) (16) (26) (73)INNOCENT 42.5% 21.9% 35.6% 63.5%64.6% 51.6% 72.2%
(3) (8) (2) (13)
QUITE OFTEN or 23.1% 61.5% 15.4%. 11.3%
MOST ARE INNOCENT 6.3% 25.8% 5.6%
COLUMN TOTALS (48) (31) (36) (115)41.7% 27.0% 31.3% 100%
CHm-SQUARE TEST: SIGNIFICANT AT .05
Two jurors did not answer.
Type A jurors were the most likely to believe that defendants
are seldom or almost never innocent, but this difference was
not as great as may have been expected.54 Part of the problem
with this question lay in the coding of its responses 55-to some
people the "occasionally innocent" response meant "only occa-
sionally," while to others it conveyed greater frequency. In
many interviews, jurors stressed the "only" aspect of the re-
sponse but still believed that the "occasionally innocent" re-
sponse accurately reflected their views. Although this language
problem could not be corrected after the fact, it may explain
why the predicted pattern was not stronger. Interestingly,
Type B (antiauthoritarian) jurors were nearly five times as
likely as other groups to think either that most defendants are
53. Surely one can believe generally that few defendants are innocent, yet
still apply the presumption of innocence in a given case. One juror in the sam-
ple group admitted that he thought most defendants were guilty, but said that
because he was aware of his attitude, he resolved every doubt in favor of the
defendant. Nonetheless, a presumption of guilt would probably most often
work to the disadvantage of defendants.
54. 29.2% of the Type A jurors held this view, as did approximately 22% of
the other two groups. Although not strilting, this difference is statistically sig-
nificant at the .05 level
55. For a list of the alternative responses to this question, see note 38
supra.
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innocent or that defendants are "quite often" innocent. 56 Al-
though Type B jurors represented only 27.0% of those respond-
ing to the question, they comprised 61.5% of those who more
frequently perceived the defendant as innocent.5 7
The third measure of bias used in the study concerned the
effect of the defendant's possible sentence on jurors.5 8 Jurors
rarely know what the sentence might be for a given crime, and
they are instructed simply to base their verdicts on the facts. It
is therefore not surprising that most jurors (approximately sev-
enty-seven percent) responded that they either did not know or
did not consider the possible sentence. The responses of the
other twenty-seven jurors appear in Table 3.
TABLE 3. Sentencing effect by LAQ groups.
The defendant's
possible sentence (raw #)
caused the row % Type A Type B Type C ROW
juror to: column % jurors jurors jurors TOTALS
(1) (3) (1) (5)
FAVOR ACQUTITAL 20.0% 60.0% 20.0% 18.5%
10.0% 42.9% 10.0%
(7) (1) (0) (8)
FAVOR CONVICTION 87.5% 12.5% 29.6%
70.0% 14.3%
(2) (3) (9) (14)
HAD NO EFFECT 14.3% 21.4% 64.3% 51.9%
20.0% 42.9% 90.0%
COLUMN TOTALS (10) (7) (10) (27)
37.0% 25.9% 37.0% 100%
CHI-SQUARE TEST: SIGNIFICANT AT.05 59
Theoretically, Type A jurors should lean more often toward
conviction, and Table 3 shows that in fact they were approxi-
56. 25.8% of the Type B jurors held this view, as compared with only ap-
proximately 6% of the other two groups.
57. The pattern in Table 2 is even more interesting when viewed in light of
the study's follow-up questions. Jurors were asked whether their thoughts on
this question came to mind during the trial and how important these thoughts
were to their choice of verdict. Of the 14 Type A jurors who thought defendants
were seldom or never innocent, exactly half stated that this perception came to
them during the trial, and the same half considered it somewhat or very impor-
tant to their verdict. Of the seven Type B and eight Type C jurors who had the
same perception, only two of each stated that it came to them during the trial.
58. See note 39 supra.
59. The number of jurors included in this table-27-is small because most
jurors indicated that they did not know or consider the possible sentence. Still,
if the whole sample of jurors is assessed by dichotomizing the responses to this
item into those "leaning toward conviction" and "all other responses," the pro-
portion of LAQ groups revealing the bias does not change, and the pattern is
significant at the .05 level.
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mately five times more likely than other jurors to do so. 60 Type
B jurors, on the other hand, should perceive sentences as
heavy and be influenced toward acquittal more often. As Table
3 shows, Type B jurors were approximately four times more
likely than other jurors to lean toward acquittal because of the
possible sentence.6 1 Finally, as would be expected from the
LAQ construct, Type C jurors were overwhelmingly the group
more likely to be unaffected by possible sentences.62
The two other measures of bias-the stage of trial at which
jurors first began forming a verdict preference and the jurors'
ratings of the attorneys' performance-both produced patterns
consistent with those predicted by the LAQ.63 The patterns on
each single question, however, were not statistically significant.
Nevertheless, because these measures are intuitively meaning-
ful, they are included in the index in Table 4.
It is possible that some of the jurors who revealed just one
of the above biases were not actually prejudiced against de-
fendants, although, for certain measures of bias, the prejudice
is intuitively obvious.64 This helps to explain why Type B and
C jurors may exhibit some of the indicators of "conviction-
prone" bias. The inexactitude of these measures of bias can be
mitigated, however, by focusing on the jurors who revealed
multiple biases. This can be accomplished by means of an in-
dex that combines responses to all the individual measures of
60. 70.0% of the Type A jurors who stated that they had considered the
sentence indicated that it made them favor conviction, while 14.3% of the Type
B jurors and none of the Type C jurors gave similar indications.
61. 42.9% of the Type B jurors favored acquittal because of the sentence,
as opposed to only 10.0% of either of the other groups.
62. 90.0% of the Type C jurors who considered the sentence said it had no
effect at all, as did only 20.0% and 42.9% of the Type A and B jurors, respec-
tively.
63. One question asked jurors was whether, after opening arguments, they
would have voted for conviction or acquittal, or whether they were unsure.
Type A jurors were approximately twice as likely as the others to reveal a will-
ingness to convict at this stage. A second question asked jurors to specify the
point at which they first began leaning toward a verdict. A conviction-prone re-
sponse was inferred when a juror's first verdict preference was for conviction
and that preference came at a stage much earlier than the point at which most
members of the jury indicated that they first began leaning toward a verdict.
Type A jurors were twice as likely as other jurors to exhibit this bias response.
Finally, jurors rated the performance of prosecutors and defense counsel on in-
dependent scales (poor to excellent) and on a direct comparison scale. See
note 41 supra. A response was deemed conviction-prone when a juror substan-
tially overrated prosecutors or underrated defense counsel relative to the norm
rating of all jurors at the trial. Type A jurors were more than twice as likely as
either of the other groups to overrate the prosecutor; to rate defense counsel as
"only fair" or "poor"; and to underrate defense counsel.
64. For example, a presumption of guilt, see text accompanying notes 52-57
supra, would probably most often work to the disadvantage of defendants.
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bias. Such an index was constructed by summing the number
of times each juror gave a conviction-prone response in terms
of (1) disbelieving the defendant's testimony or treating his
failure to testify as evidence of guilt; (2) perceiving defendants
as seldom or almost never innocent; (3) leaning toward convic-
tion because of the possible sentence; (4) deciding for convic-
tion immediately after opening arguments or leaning toward
conviction earlier than most jurors on the same trial; or (5)
overrating the prosecutor's performance or underrating the de-
fense counsel's performance. Jurors were grouped by the
number of conviction-prone responses they gave, and this dis-
tribution was cross-tabulated with the LAQ groupings. The re-
sults are displayed in Table 4.
TABLE 4. Index of juror biases by LAQ groups.
(raw #)
row % Type A Type B Type C ROW
column % jurors jurors jurors TOTALS
(9) (13) (17) (39)
0 bias responses 23.1% 33.3% 43.6% 33.3%
18.8% 40.6% 45.9%
(13) (12) (15)
1 bias 32.5% 30.0% 37.5%
27.1% 37.5% 40.5%
(13) (5) (2)
2 biases 65.0% 25.0% 10.0%
27.1% 15.6% 5.4%
(9) (0) (1)
3 biases 90.0% 10.0%
18.8% 2.7%
(40)
34.2%
(20)
17.1%
(10)
8.5%
(4) (2) (2) (8)
4 or more biases 50.0% 25.0% 25.0% 6.8%
8.3% 6.3% 5.4%
(48) (32) (37) 0(117)COLUMN TOTALS 7
41.0% 27.4% 31.6% 100% I
CfII-SQUARE TEST: SIGNIFICANT AT .05.65
Table 4 shows that 54.2% of Type A jurors revealed two or
more conviction-prone biases, while only 21.9% of Type B and
13.5% of Type C jurors fell in this category. More impressive is
the fact that 27.1% of Type A jurors held three or more biases
against the defendant, while only 6.3% of Type B and 8.1% of
Type C jurors gave that many conviction-prone responses.
Moreover, while 40.6% of the Type B and 45.9% of the Type C
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jurors revealed no conviction biases at all, only 18.8% of the
Type A jurors were in this category.
An examination of the mean number 65 of bias responses
given by each LAQ group produced interesting results. The
mean number of conviction-prone responses given by Type B
jurors was .94, and the mean number given by Type C jurors
was .82. In other words, Type B and C jurors gave an average
of less than one conviction-prone response. The mean number
of biases exhibited by Type A jurors, however, was 1.72-ap-
proximately twice the mean of either of the other groups. Al-
though the difference observed between the means for Type B
and C jurors was not statistically significant, the difference be-
tween the mean of Type A jurors and that of either of the other
groups was statistically significant.66
To summarize, the goal of this study was to assess the use-
fulness of the LAQ as a device for screening potential jurors in
criminal trials. The relationship between LAQ-predicted biases
and actual observed biases was analyzed by comparing LAQ
groupings with juror responses to a set of post-trial questions
designed to elicit indications of bias. Although there are other
biases that may supersede those predicted from LAQ scores, 67
the significant finding is that the predicted patterns withstood
this analysis. The individual bias measures used in this study
were imprecise enough to allow some genuinely unbiased ju-
rors to appear biased on at least one of the measures. Despite
this, jurors classified as Type A (authoritarian) by their LAQ
responses were without exception those most likely to exhibit
one or more of the conviction-prone biases. Moreover, the Type
A jurors were more than twice as likely as either of the other
groups to reveal more than one bias, twice as likely to reveal
more than two biases, and four times as likely to exhibit more
than three biases. Eighty-three percent of jurors giving more
than four conviction-prone responses were Type A jurors, and
no Type B jurors revealed this level of bias.
65. The significance level is reported at .05 for the sake of consistency with
the other tables. In fact, the relationship between type of juror and number of
bias responses in Table 4 is significant at the .01 level, meaning that there is
only a one percent chance that the observed relationship between LAQ scores
and levels of bias is due to random variation.
66. See note 25 supra.
67. The t-test of statistical significance was used here. The test indicated a
71% probability that the Type B and C means differed only because of random
chance. The difference was therefore not statistically significant. On the other
hand, the chance was less than 1% that the difference between the Type A
mean and the means of the other two groups resulted from random chance.
These differences were thus statistically significant.
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That the expected pattern emerged for each of the meas-
ures of bias suggests a strong internal consistency in the au-
thoritarianism concept; it is a deep and serious source of
prejudice with widespread, yet subtle, implications. The fact
that the expected pattern held across all of the trials, despite
the wide differences in objective circumstances and the exist-
ence of possible intervening biases,68 seems to confirm that the
attitudes tapped by the LAQ are indeed fundamental and high-
ly relevant in nearly any type of criminal trial.
V. USING THE LAQ
The findings of this study, taken as a whole, show that the
LAQ is a reliable predictor of prospective jurors' relative biases
for and against defendants in criminal trials.69 Thus, the LAQ
and more refined screening devices that might be developed in
the future provide a valuable new approach to the voir dire of
prospective jurors. The need for such an approach, the benefits
and risks it presents, and the practical and policy implications
of its use are the focus of the following analysis.
Responses to the LAQ would not provide a basis to chal-
lenge jurors for cause, for such challenges normally require a
direct statement of opinion or bias by a juror0 that shows he
could not "stand indifferent"7 1 at trial.72 The LAQ labels, how-
ever, would provide an excellent basis for the intelligent use of
peremptory challenges. Either side can exercise peremptory
68. Racism is one such bias. See also note 69 infra.
69. The 18 different defendants represented diverse races, socioeconomic
statuses, demeanors, speech patterns, accents, clothing styles, and hair lengths.
All of these are possible sources of juror prejudice that would tend to result in
random bias responses. A similar randomizing effect may result from the dif-
ferent types of offenses involved, the character of victims, and other differences
in trial circumstances.
70. A number of methodological problems arose because actual trials were
used as a laboratory. See note 27 supra. However, the predicted bias patterns
occurred despite such inherent difficulties.
71. Caselaw and statutes adhere to the notion that a juror's admission of
bias must normally take the form of a personal statement expressing his inabil-
ity to reach a verdict solely on the evidence. See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S.
717, 724 (1961); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 78, § 14 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979). An implied
bias will not support a challenge for cause except on certain narrow grounds
defined by statute, such as when a prospective juror is an interested party or is
personally familiar with the parties or their counsel. For a discussion of these
grounds and their possible expansion, see Note, supra note 7, at 1498-1501 &
nn.28-36.
72. Lord Coke described an impartial juror as "indifferent as he stands un-
sworne." 1 E. COKE, FIRST PART OF THE INSTrrUTE OF THE LAws OF ENGLAND; OR
A COMMENTARY UPON LrrTLETON § 234, at 155.a (1st American ed. 1853).
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challenges without stating any ground whatsoever.73 The im-
portance of peremptories goes beyond the statutory framework
that structures their use. The Supreme Court has noted that
"[t]he persistence of peremptories and their extensive use
demonstrate the long and widely held belief that peremptory
challenge is a necessary part of trial by jury,"74 and that "[t]he
right of [peremptory] challenge comes from the common law
with the trial by jury itself, and has always been held essential
to the fairness of trial by jury."75 Given the importance of per-
emptories, voir dire questions aimed only at the exercise of
peremptories have generally been allowed.76
Despite the importance of the peremptory challenge, con-
ventional voir dire questioning frequently provides an inade-
quate basis for the intelligent exercise of peremptories.
Prospective jurors often fail to disclose and sometimes even de-
liberately conceal opinions that seriously bias their ability to
render an impartial decision. 77 This deception is understanda-
73. The LAQ does not direct jurors to consider the truth or falsity of any
statement, nor does it involve other direct statements of juror opinion. The
LAQ simply asks jurors to indicate the statements with which they most and
least agree. The LAQ result is simply a prediction of how likely a juror is to be
biased, and is not an implied admission of bias. See note 71 supra. Only indi-
rectly does the LAQ facilitate voir dire aimed at challenges for cause: when at-
torney-conducted voir dire is permitted, counsel for both sides can first use
LAQ responses to identify those prospective jurors who are the most extreme,
and then concentrate aggressive questioning toward such jurors, in hopes of
eliciting admissions that would constitute cause. The fact that the LAQ would
not be a basis to challenge for cause suggests that courts will not be inclined to
initiate use of the LAQ or similar devices. Trial counsel will thus have to re-
quest its inclusion with voir dire. Even after such a request, the trial judge
may refuse to include the LAQ with voir dire. See notes 101-124 infra and ac-
companying text.
74. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) ('The essential na-
ture of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason
stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control."); N.Y.
CRzi. PRoc. LAw § 360.30 (McKinney 1979).
75. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
76. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892). Cf. Stilson v. United
States, 250 U.S. 583, 586-87 (1919) (suggesting that the peremptory is simply a
statutory privilege). For an analysis of why Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202
(1965), could be read as virtually overruling Stilson, see Babcock, supra note 2,
at 555-56.
77. Not all states have approved of voir dire aimed solely at the exercise of
peremptories. See, e.g., People v. Rigney, 55 Cal. 2d 236, 244, 359 P.2d 23, 27-28,
10 Cal. Rptr. 625, 629-30 (1961). But see People v. Terry, 61 Cal. 2d 137, 390 P.2d
381, 37 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1964) (implying that the intelligent exercise of perempto-
ries requires voir dire directed to that end). In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202
(1965), however, the Supreme Court put to rest the argument that exercising
peremptories is not a valid purpose of voir dire: '"The voir dire in American tri-
als tends to be extensive and probing, operating as a predicate for the exercise
of peremptories . . . ." Id. at 218-19. See United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d
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ble since prospective jurors often feel that jury duty is imbued
with civic approval and that dismissal for prejudice is a stigma
to be avoided.78 Indeed, it is possible that a juror may lie sim-
ply to gain the opportunity to exercise his prejudice.7 9 Some
commentators feel that the problem of deception by prospec-
tive jurors is growing because of the effort to streamline voir
dire by having only judges question the juror panel.80 When
voir dire consists of nothing more than a judge questioning all
members of a panel at the same time, the group dynamics of
the setting alone make it difficult for even a sincere prospective
juror to admit harboring the types of prejudice the peremptory
challenge was designed to eliminate.81 For all of these reasons,
trial lawyers are often left to intuition, surmise, and guesswork
in exercising their peremptories.
The lack of meaningful information that can be obtained
through direct voir dire questioning has prompted the use of at
least two other types of selection tactics that many consider
undesirable: background investigations82 and public opinion
polls. 83 Background investigations may include interviews with
340, 367-68 (7th Cir. 1972) ("The government argues that the court is obligated
to inquire only into matters that would disqualify a juror for cause .... We
disagree.... [T]he defendants must, upon request, be permitted sufficient in-
quiry into the background and attitudes of the jurors to enable them to exer-
cise intelligently their peremptory challenges."), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970
(1973). See also Bailey v. United States, 53 F.2d 982, 984 (5th Cir. 1931).
78. Professor Broeder has documented widespread deception by prospec-
tive jurors. Broeder, supra note 9. One type of deception is withholding rele-
vant information unless it is specifically requested. The practice is illustrated
by a narcotics-sale case in which a juror did not mention that she was married
to a member of a local crime commission that was in the midst of an anti-dope
campaign, and by a car-theft case in which a juror did not reveal that he was
once arrested for car theft. Another type of deception is more blatant- several
jurors, when asked about any connections with the parties or their counsel, did
not mention, respectively, that one worked for a company also represented by
the present defense lawyers and had in fact dealt with one of the lawyers on
several occasions; that one was a close friend of the plaintiff's family; and that
one had previously been generously compensated by the defendant railroad for
an unrelated accident. Id. at 507-11.
79. See, e.g., id. at 511.
80. See id. at 510-14. See also Babcock, supra note 2, at 547-48.
81. See Babcock, supra note 2, at 548-49; Broeder, supra note 9, at 503-05.
For a discussion of the relative merits of attorney-conducted versus judge-con-
ducted voir dire, see Gutman, The Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire of Jurors: A
Constitutional Right, 39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 290 (1972); Note, Judge-Conducted
Voir Dire as a Time-Saving Trial Technique, 2 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 161 (1970). For
empirical evidence indicating that the time saved may be minimal, see Levit,
Nelson, Ball & Chernick, supra note 6, at 936-55; Zeisel, supra note 10, at 711.
82. This inference is intuitively clear to most trial lawyers. For empirical
evidence, see Broeder, supra note 9, at 510-14.
83. For a discussion of investigation techniques, see Okun, Investigation of
Jurors by Counsel: Its Impact on the Decisional Process, 56 GEO. I.. 838 (1968).
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a prospective juror's friends, neighbors, and co-workers,84 as
well as examinations of more personal data.8 5 The practice
raises obvious right to privacy concerns.8 6 Because it.directly
taps relevant juror attitudes, the LAQ offers lawyers more reli-
able information than the secondhand recollections and infer-
ences gathered in typical background investigations, and thus
can obviate much of the need for such investigations. More-
over, the availability of such screening devices might make the
legal restriction of background investigations more defensible.
The use of public opinion polls to systematize jury selec-
tion is a more recent response to the problems of voir dire
questioning. 87 This new tactic has arguably been responsible
for acquittals in a number of celebrated cases.88 Polling tactics,
however, have also led to charges of jury-rigging and calls for
restricting the use of such tactics because of the unfair advan-
tage they may give one side.8 9 Although the LAQ is potentially
vulnerable to the same charges, it would be a simple matter to
structure its use to avoid the problems of public opinion polls.
Polling questions are usually drafted with the needs of only
For a criticism of these tactics, see Comment, Computers and Scientific Jury
Selection" A Calculated Risk, 55 U. DET. J. URB. L. 345, 356-64 (1978).
84. See authorities cited in note 12 supra. See generally note 88 infra. See
also Van Dyke, supra note 12, at 616-21.
85. See Okun, supra note 83.
86. Prosecutors have sometimes utilized the records of government agen-
cies. See United States v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.) (prosecutor examined
prospective jurors' prior tax returns before selecting jury for tax prosecution),
cert. denied, 357 U.S. 937 (1958); Van Dyke, supra note 12, at 619 n.34 (prosecu-
tor used FBI to conduct background investigations of jurors).
87. See Comment, supra note 83, at 356-64.
88. Typically, a poll is conducted of a sample drawn from the same lists
used for jury selection (e.g., voter registration lists, driver's license lists) to as-
certain attitudes toward particular legal or social issues relevant to the trial
(e.g., attitudes toward the Vietnam War, race relations, or the American Indian
Movement). The respondents' attitudes are correlated with the sample's demo-
graphic characteristics (age, race, sex, occupation) to create a profile of desira-
ble and undesirable jurors. During voir dire, a prospective juror's demographic
traits are compared to the profile, and jurors whose traits correlate highly with
"undesirable" attitudes are peremptorily struck. See THE JURY SYSTEM: NEW
METHODS FOR REDUCING JURY PREJUDICE (D. Kairys ed. 1975). Although the
nominal aim of these tactics is the selection of more impartial juries, the tactics
on their face function only to strike prospective jurors who may be unfavorable
to a single side.
89. The cases include the Mitchell-Stans Watergate trial, several trials of
Vietnam War protesters, and the Joan Little trial. Compare Etzioni, supra note
12 (acquittals in the celebrated cases resulted in large part from the selection
tactics) with Saks, Social Scientists Can't Rig Juries, PSYCH. TODAY, Jan. 1976,
at 48 (rebutting same proposition).
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one side in mind.9 0 Furthermore, even if the polling informa-
tion generated for a given case is helpful to both sides, the poll
itself is often quite expensive, and this makes it less fair to
force one side to turn over its results to the other. The LAQ, on
the other hand, taps an attitude dimension-authoritarianism
and antiauthoritarianism-that is inherently meaningful to
both sides in a criminal trial. Moreover, the LAQ is very inex-
pensive and would pose no fairness problem if a court ordered
its results shared. Thus, the LAQ can be administered in a
manner that is wholly fair to both sides. Finally, the availabil-
ity of direct attitude information from a questionnaire like the
LAQ may lessen interest in polling tactics because the attitude
information elicited from polls is more inferential, based solely
on the demographic traits of prospective jurors.91
Use of the LAQ during voir dire should produce the infor-
mation needed for more effective use of peremptories, but the
LAQ is not a substitute for conventional voir dire. Prejudice
unrelated to authority could, in any particular case, override
the authoritarian bias predictable from LAQ responses. An an-
tiauthoritarian juror (Type B) who is also a racist, for example,
may not behave as predicted if the defendant is black.92 Direct
questioning regarding specific prejudices may offer the only
hope of identifying these sources of juror bias. The LAQ would
nevertheless be an important supplement to conventional voir
dire questioning.
The LAQ takes fifteen to twenty minutes to complete and
can be administered to a panel of prospective jurors at one sit-
ting. There is no need for the judge to be present; the LAQ can
be administered by other court staff when the panel is first as-
sembled. Juror responses can be scored by the staff of either
or both the defense counsel and prosecutor while conventional
90. See Silver, A Case Against the Use of Public Opinion Polls as an Aid in
Jury Selection, 6 RUT. J. COMPUTERS & L. 177 (1978).
91. Any specific attitude measured in a poll is helpful to both sides. For
example, information revealing that New York Times readers in a given com-
munity are more likely to be biased against Native Americans than readers of
local papers in that community could be equally valuable to both prosecutors
and defense counsel in a trial involving American Indian Movement leaders.
Since one side may design the poll to measure only certain attitudes and demo-
graphic traits, however, the side not involved at the design stage may lack an
opportunity to include questions about the attitudes it considers important.
Thus, even though the results of any particular poll may be equally meaningful
to both the prosecution and the defense, the process of polling is designed to
help one side and is not sensitive to the informational needs of both sides.
92. See note 88 supra.
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questioning takes place.93 The scores will then be available to
both sides and can be taken into account when peremptory
challenges are exercised.94 This process might even save time
by obviating the need for individual questions that bear on atti-
tudes measured by the LAQ.95
The value of the LAQ during voir dire, however, is not
merely its efficiency; it provides information that conventional
voir dire questioning cannot provide. As a reliable predictor of
bias, the LAQ can help overcome the problem of juror decep-
tion during voir dire, regardless of whether the deception stems
from a determination to avoid dismissal, a failure to recognize
one's own biases, the inhibiting effect of group questioning by a
judge, or malice towards one of the trial opponents. This is be-
cause indirect questioning like the LAQ is generally superior to
direct questioning for unmasking true attitudes. Rather than
asking jurors whether they favor one side over the other-the
"correct" answer to which may be given without revealing one's
true feelings-the LAQ asks respondents to indicate relative
agreement or disagreement with a series of statements, al-
though they might never admit such choices directly. This
forced-choice ranking is a method of indirect questioning that
identifies deep-seated attitudes, which in turn are reliable
predictors of actual bias against criminal defendants.96
Some may contend that jurors who hide biases during di-
rect voir dire will do so in response to the LAQ as well. The
93. For examples of other possible superseding biases, see note 69 supra.
94. In a noncelebrated, noncapital case, the entire panel may consist of
only 25 to 30 prospective jurors. The set of LAQ responses could easily be
scored, averaged, and labeled in about half an hour. One study of voir dire
practices shows that even the voir dire conducted entirely by judges lasts
longer than this. See Levit, Nelson, Ball & Chernick, supra note 6, at 946-48, 958-
59.
95. Two basic approaches are usually followed in organizing voir dire chal-
lenges. See generally Judicial Conference Comm. on the Operation of the Jury
System, The Jury System in the Federal Courts, 26 F.RD. 409, 468 (1960). Under
the "struck juror" method, prospective jurors are first called and examined, in
turn, with dismissals for cause permitted where appropriate. Once the number
called and not struck reaches the sum of 12 plus the statutory number of per-
emptory challenges for both sides, counsel begin exercising peremptories until
only 12 remain (or more if alternates are to be selected). The alternative
method requires counsel to exercise their peremptories or to accept the juror
as each one is called. This leaves counsel in the position of gambling on
whether the next persons called will be "better" or "Worse." If LAQ-type re-
sponses from all prospective jurors were available at the outset of voir dire,
counsel could more intelligently exercise peremptories under either system.
96. For example, in cases in which a police officer will be testifying, attor-
neys often question prospective jurors to discover if they tend to give extra
credence to police testimony. This and related lines of questioning are
designed to reach attitudes tapped by the LAQ.
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results of this study, however, undercut this contention. The
jurors in this study would be as inclined as any to project
themselves as impartial and to pattern their responses to the
LAQ accordingly. In fact, the sample jurors would probably
have been more prone to attempt to skew their responses,
since they were aware that their "performance" as jurors was
the subject of the study. Still, as the findings show, the jurors
whose LAQ responses predicted bias were those most often
displaying actual bias.97
On balance, the LAQ offers a major improvement over di-
rect questioning by counsel and over group questioning by the
judge alone. Such improvement is important not only for the
adversaries, but also for enhancing the impartiality of juries.
Assuming that conventional voir dire questioning will result in
the removal for cause of those who admit partiality, and that ju-
ror comments that intuitively reveal prejudice will be the basis
of initial peremptory challenges, LAQ responses can be used
by both sides to exercise their remaining peremptory chal-
lenges against those who score on the Type A or Type B ex-
tremes of the LAQ spectrum. There can be no guarantee that
the resulting jury would be unbiased, but the process would
provide both the prosecutor 98 and defense counsel with relia-
ble information so that they can intelligently exercise their per-
emptory challenges. This maximizes the likelihood that the
jury will be the most impartial one available from a given ve-
nire.99
97. The superiority of indirect questioning seems most clear when the
source of juror deception is taken into account. A well-intentioned juror might
not consciously perceive his underlying bias, or, if he does, might reasonably
decide not to make such an embarrassing admission. This kind of admission is
particularly difficult when it must be delivered before a group of people, none
of whom have made similar admissions. Understandable timidity and the fail-
ure to recognize one's own biases are the most frequent sources of juror decep-
tion; both are remedied by the indirect, forced-choice design of the LAQ.
98. Another fear might be that prospective jurors who do not want to serve
would skew their responses to the LAQ in order to appear undesirable. Most
persons who want to evade jury duty, however, can do so on the basis of hard-
ship or other statutory grounds for exemption. See, e.g., MIN. STAT. § 593.45(2)
(Supp. 1980). For that matter, one seeking to appear undesirable can easily ac-
complish this by giving the "wrong" answers to conventional direct questioning
on voir dire. LAQ-type devices neither create, worsen, nor solve this potential
problem.
99. At English common law, the peremptory challenge originated as a right
of the defendant. See Moore, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors: I. The English
Practice, 16 GEo. LJ. 438 (1928). In the United States, the peremptory has al-
ways been available to prosecutors as wellz "[Ilmpartiality requires not only
freedom from any bias against the accused, but also from any prejudice against
his prosecution." Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887).
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Although pursuit of information for peremptories is both
proper and essential for assuring impartiality, it is ustially
within the trial court's discretion whether the LAQ, a similar
device, or any specific voir dire question can be used.10 0 Per-
haps the single greatest concern that courts have in exercising
their discretion on this point is the time and cost of lengthy
voir dire to the public and the jurors.O' Proper administration
of the LAQ or similar screening devices need not be time-con-
suming, however, and might even save time by removing a
wide subject area from the individual questioning phase.102
A second concern of courts is that lawyers not use voir dire
to "condition" jurors. 0 3 Although any line of questioning con-
ditions jurors to some extent, the questions that cause the most
judicial concern are those that have little bearing on prejudice
and serve only to "try the issues" during voir dire rather than
at trial. The LAQ poses no real problem in this respect. Be-
cause jurors are not asked to acknowledge the truth or falsity
of any LAQ statement, 0 4 they are not encouraged to form an
opinion on the legal issues that underlie the LAQ. Second,
LAQ statements are standardized rather than tailored to the
circumstances or issues of any particular trial. Moreover, the
relevance of LAQ responses to actual prejudice is intuitively
clear and is also established by this study.105 Finally, an im-
plicit element of the "conditioning" concern is the usual one-
100. "Experience has shown that one of the most effective means to free the
jury box from men unfit to be there is the exercise of the peremptory chal-
lenge." Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887). Cf. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202, 219 (1965) ('The function of the [peremptory] challenge is not only to
eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties that the
jurors before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence
placed before them, and not otherwise.") (emphasis added).
101. This discretionary power may be established by statute, see, e.g., N.J.
REV. STAT. § 2A.78-4 (1976); by rule, see, e.g., FED. R. Cram. P. 24(a); or by case
law, see, e.g., Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 310 (1931).
102. See, e.g., People v. Crowe, 8 Cal. 3d 815, 828 n.22, 506 P.2d 193, 202 n.22,
106 Cal. Rptr. 369, 378 n.22 (1973) (duty to restrict voir dire to expedite trial)
(citing People v. Semone, 140 Cal. App. 318, 326, 35 P.2d 379, 383 (1934)). See
generally Levit, Nelson, Ball & Chernick, supra note 6.
103. See text accompanying note 96 supra.
104. "Conditioning" may take the form of "preinstructing" prospective ju-
rors on the facts of the case or on law applicable to those facts. The statements
in the LAQ are standardized and could not be used to such ends. Another con-
ditioning device is to commit a juror in advance on an important issue. Usually
this involves questioning a juror about his willingness to award money dam-
ages if fact X is found. Obviously, the LAQ could not be used to achieve this
effect. Finally, attorneys sometimes use voir dire to establish a "good guy" rap-
port with jurors. The LAQ certainly has no impact on jurors in this regard. See
generally Levit, Nelson, Ball & Chernick, supra note 6, at 942-46.
105. For the text of the LAQ instructions, see Appendix.
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sidedness of voir dire questioning.106 To the extent that the
LAQ, like any question, may condition jurors, it does so in
ways that benefit both sides.
The discretion of trial judges to restrict voir dire related to
peremptories is quite sweeping because appellate courts have
been reluctant to reverse jury verdicts when the only provable
issue was possible bias arising from the refusal to allow partic-
ular questions.107 Although declining to reverse verdicts in
many cases,108 appellate courts have announced guidelines for
the scope of voir dire that are similar to the relevancy standard
applied for judging the admissibility of evidence. For example,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has held that
the scope of voir dire relating to peremptory challenges should
reach "matters concerning which either the local community or
the population at large is commonly known to harbor strong
feelings that may stop short of presumptive bias in law, yet sig-
nificantly skew deliberations in fact."109 The LAQ is designed
to help ascertain the existence of biases that might "signifi-
cantly skew" deliberations. In United States v. Dellinger,11o the
Seventh Circuit held that "[a]t a minimum ... inquiry must
be made into matters where the likelihood of prejudice is so
106. In establishing the relevance of possible prejudice to voir dire ques-
tions, courts have acknowledged the use of social science methods like those
employed here. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 475 F.2d 376, 381 & n.10
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
107. In United States v. Robinson, 475 F.2d 376 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the defense
counsel was denied an opportunity at voir dire to question jurors on their atti-
tudes toward the defense of self-defense, on the ground that it would "inject"
legal issues before evidence was submitted. The court feared that this defense
might not actually be used at trial and that the defendant would unfairly bene-
fit from raising it at voir dire. The circuit court rejected the trial court's argu-
ment, suggesting that the problem could be resolved by a cautionary
instruction to the effect that voir dire questions are not evidence. Id. at 380.
108. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 475 F.2d 376, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Krueter v. United States, 376 F.2d 654, 657 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
1015 (1968); Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641, 647 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 374
U.S. 829 (1963).
109. For criticism of the lack of clear standards defining when trial courts
may be reversed, see Note, supra note 7, at 1509-15.
110. United States v. Robinson, 475 F.2d 376, 381 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Among the
"commonly known" matters that "the trial court must take into account and
[that] govern... voir dire accordingly" are prejudice against wagering, the use
of intoxicants, witnesses who are admitted liars, and religious minorities. Id. at
381 n.9 (emphasis added). The Robinson court further allowed that sources of
prejudice that might "significantly skew deliberations" could still be inquired
into, but that "it is incumbent upon the proponent to lay a foundation for his
question by showing that it is reasonably calculated to discover an actual and
likely source of prejudice, rather than pursue a speculative will-o-the-wisp." Id.
at 381. Clearly, the evidence established in this study linking LAQ attitudes
with actual authoritarian biases is much more than "speculative."
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great that not to inquire would risk failure in assembling an im-
partial jury.""' Among matters to which the Dellinger court
made reference were the "conflict of values... symbolized in
the confrontation between the city police and the demonstra-
tors. A juror's basic sympathies with the actors in these events
could easily impair his ability to consider alternative views of
the case as presented in court.".1 2 This standard for the mini-
mum scope of voir dire questioning that trial judges must al-
low" 3 seems on its face to encompass LAQ-type inquiries. The
Fifth Circuit has suggested a standard that would allow ques-
tions "reasonably practicable to enable the accused to have the
benefit of the right of peremptory challenge or to prevent un-
fairness in the trial."n4 The practicability of the LAQ has been
discussed previously.115
In addition to establishing minimum guidelines for lines of
inquiry that judges must permit at voir dire, appellate courts
have occasionally required that certain types of questions be
allowed. The District of Columbia Circuit found reversible er-
ror when a trial court refused to allow voir dire questions bear-
ing on whether prospective jurors tended to give extra
credence to police testimony simply because it was police testi-
mony."i6 The Tenth Circuit is in accord. 17 It is precisely this
type of prejudice that the LAQ taps.
Despite such cases and the general standards set forth by
some courts, at least one other circuit118 and the Supreme
Court have indicated their unwillingness to set minimum stan-
dards for the scope of voir dire."l9 Thus, it is doubtful whether
a trial judge must allow use of the LAQ at the risk of subse-
quent reversal.120 Lawyers who seek to employ the LAQ or
111. 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973).
112. 472 F.2d at 368.
113. Id. at 369 (emphasis added).
114. The court added. "We have pointed out the inadequacy of a general
question in testing a juror's possible prejudice in a specific area where it may
well exist." Id.
115. Bailey v. United States, 53 F.2d 982, 984 (5th Cir. 1931) (emphasis ad-
ded).
116. See text accompanying notes 70-98 supra.
117. Brown v. United States, 338 F.2d 543, 544-45 (D.C. Cir. 1964). See also
Sellers v. United States, 271 F.2d 475, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1959). The opinion in
Brown was authored by Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger. This is most inter-
esting, given the trend of recent Supreme Court decisions concerning voir dire.
See note 120 infra.
118. See Chavez v. United States, 258 F.2d 816, 819 (10th Cir. 1958).
119. See Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641, 646-47 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
374 U.S. 829 (1963).
120. In Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973), the trial court did not al-
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similar screening devices should therefore focus their efforts on
persuading the trial court that the LAQ is a proper and rele-
vant method of inquiry,121 that it comes within the minimum
standards for voir dire questioning that appellate courts have
recommended, that it is fair if the results are shared with op-
posing counsel, and that it can be administered very efficiently.
In the event that a trial judge should refuse to allow use of
the LAQ as a whole, an attorney may still find it helpful to em-
ploy as many individual sets of forced-choice questions' 22 as
the court will allow. Although this approach clearly lacks the
reliability or statistical probability of a complete screening de-
vice,1 23 it at least elicits responses that are intuitively meaning-
ful to the practitioner.
VI. CONCLUSION
The field study showed that the LAQ was a reliable predic-
tor of actual bias: Type A (authoritiarian) jurors were two to
low voir dire questions relating to racial prejudice or prejudice against beards.
The Supreme Court reversed on the issue, citing lack of inquiry regarding ra-
cial bias, but made it clear that minimal inquiry about race would have been a
sufficient basis to affirm. The Court would not have reversed solely on the fa-
cial-hair-prejudice matter- "Given the traditionally broad discretion accorded
to the trial judge in conducting voir dire,... and our inability to constitution-
ally distinguish possible prejudice against beards from a host of other possible
similar prejudices, we do not believe the petitioner's constitutional rights were
violated." Id. at 528.
If there was any doubt after Ham about the Court's willingness to put voir
dire standards on a constitutional footing, they were resolved in the negative in
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976). In Ristaino, the Court held that "[t]he
Constitution does not always entitle a defendant to have questions posed dur-
ing voir dire specifically directed to matters that conceivably might prejudice
veniremen against him." Id. at 594. Ristaino involved a black on trial for
armed robbery, and the Court found this situation quite different from that in
Ham, a case involving a black civil rights activist on trial for possession of ma-
rijuana. Id. at 595. The trial court did not have to inquire about racial prejudice
in Ristaino because racial issues were not "inextricably bound up with the con-
duct of the trial." Id. at 597. Ristaino was a state prosecution, and the Court
indicated that it probably would have required the racial inquiries in federal
courts under the Court's supervisory power. Id. at 597 n.9.
121. See notes 108-109 supra and accompanying text.
122. Perhaps the most compelling reason trial courts should exercise their
discretion to allow devices like the IAQ is the fundamental policy underlying
trial by jury in criminal cases: the need to impose a buffer between the state
and the individual when the state seeks to deprive the individual of his physi-
cal liberty. By identifying jurors who hold beliefs at the extremes of the au-
thoritarianism spectrum, the LAQ enhances the jury's buffer function. See
note 2 supra.
123. In other words, the attorney should take a pair of authoritarian and an-
tiauthoritarian statements and ask the juror which one he agrees with most
and least.
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five times more likely than jurors of either other group to dis-
play each of the conviction-prone biases studied and were over-
wheliningly more likely to reveal multiple biases as well.
Moreover, the consistency of the bias pattern across all trials
and across all measures of bias indicated that these attitudes
toward authority are fundamental and operate to a significant
degree in virtually every type of criminal trial. The biases that
flow from these attitudes may be subtle, but they are powerful
and verdict-relevant.
Although LAQ responses probably would not be a basis for
challenging jurors for cause, the questionnaire could be a valu-
able part of voir dire aimed at the intelligent exercise of per-
emptories. Use of the LAQ would provide more accurate and
reliable information about the attitudes and prejudices of pro-
spective jurors. It can help resolve the problem of juror decep-
tion and can obviate much of the need for recently developed
selection tactics such as background investigations and polls.
The efficiency of administering the LAQ can help reduce the
time pressures that are transforming voir dire into a judge-con-
ducted procedure. Moreover, by improving the accuracy of per-
emptory challenges for both sides, the LAQ or some similar
device could make criminal juries as a whole more impartial.
Allowing use of the LAQ or similar devices is a matter
within the discretion of the trial courts. Nevertheless, the re-
fusal to allow some form of inquiry into authority-related bi-
ases has been held reversible error in a number of cases.
Furthermore, the major concerns of courts in exercising their
discretion to restrict voir dire are not presented by the LAQ.
Use of the LAQ could reduce the total time spent on voir dire,
and it would neither "condition" jurors nor "try the issues"
before trial has begun. Most importantly, the LAQ is not
designed with the needs of only one side in mind. Rather, it
taps significant prejudices relevant to both sides. Trial courts
should allow use of the LAQ because it clearly comes within
the scope of voir dire guidelines set out by appellate courts, be-
cause it promotes the policy objectives behind voir dire, and
because it can be administered efficiently.
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APPENDIX
The Legal Attitudes Questionnaire appears on the next few pages
exactly as it was administered, except that the subscale for each item is
marked where the respondents would place their marks. "A" indicates
the authoritarian response, "AA" indicates the antiauthoritarian re-
sponse, and "E" indicates the equalitarian response.
LEGAL AITITUDES QUESTIONNAIRE
There are ten groups of statements on the following pages, each expressing a
commonly held opinion about law enforcement, legal procedures and other
things connected with the judicial system. There are three statements in each
group.
Please put a plus mark (+) on the line next to the statement in a group that
you agree with most, and a minus (-) mark next to the statement you agree
with the least. The statements are not true or false in any sense and you
should not try to judge any of them as true or false. They are opinions and you
merely mark the one you agree with the most and the one you agree with the
least.
An example of a set of statements might be:
+ A. The failure of a defendant to testify in his own behalf should
not be taken as an indication of guilt.
B. The majority of persons arrested are innocent of any crime.
- C. Giving an obviously guilty criminal a long drawn-out trial is a
waste of the taxpayer's money.
In this example, the person answering has agreed most with statement A and
least with statement C.
Please try to work carefully, choosing the item you agree with most and the
one you agree with least in each set of statements. There is no time limit on
this questionnaire, but do not spend too much time on any set of statements.
Some sets are more difficult than others, but please do not omit any set of
statements.
Set I
"AA" A. Unfair treatment of underprivileged groups and classes is the
chief cause of crime.
"A" B. Too many obviously guilty persons escape punishment be-
cause of legal technicalities.
"E" C. The Supreme Court is, by and large, an effective guardian of
the Constitution.
Set H
"A" A. Evidence illegally obtained should be admissible in court if
such evidence is the only way of obtaining a conviction.
"AA" B. Most prosecuting attorneys have a strong sadistic streak.
"E" C. Search warrants should clearly specify the persons or things
to be seized.
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Set III
"AA" A. No one should be convicted of a crime on the basis of
circumstantial evidence, no matter how strong such evidence
is.
"E" B. There is no need in a criminal case for the accused to prove
his innocence beyond a reasonable doubt.
"A" C. Any person who resists arrest commits a crime.
Set IV
"B" A. When determining a person's guilt or innocence, the exist-
ence of a prior arrest record should not be considered.
"AA" B. Wiretapping by anyone and for any reason should be com-
pletely illegal.
"A" C. A lot of recent Supreme Court decisions sound suspiciously
Communistic.
Set V
"AA" A. Treachery and deceit are common tools of prosecutors.
"A" B. Defendants in a criminal case should be required to take the
witness stand.
"E" C. All too often, minority group members do not get fair trials.
Set VI
"AA" A. Because of the oppression and persecution minority group
members suffer, they deserve leniency and special treatment
in the courts.
"E" B. Citizens need to be protected against excessive police power
as well as against criminals.
"A" C. Persons who testify in court against underworld characters
should be allowed to do so anonymously to protect them-
selves from retaliation.
Set VII
"E" A. It is better for society that several guilty men be freed than
one innocent one wrongfully imprisoned.
"A" B. Accused persons should be required to take lie-detector tests.
"AA" C. When there is a "hung" jury in a criminal case, the defendant
should always be freed and the indictment dismissed.
Set VIII
"AA" A. A society with true freedom and equality for all would have
very little crime.
"E" B. It is moral and ethical for a lawyer to represent a defendant
in a criminal case even when he believes his client is guilty.
"A" C. Police should be allowed to arrest and question suspicious
looking persons to determine whether they have been up to
something illegal.
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Set IX
"A" A. The law coddles criminals to the detriment of society.
"AA" B. A lot of judges have connections with the underworld.
"E" C. The freedom of society is endangered as much by over-
zealous law enforcement as by the acts of individual
criminals.
Set X
"AA" A. There is just about no such thing as an honest cop.
"E" B. In the long run, liberty is more important than order.
"A" C. Upstanding citizens have nothing to fear from the police.
